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I. GENERAL INFORMATION
A. STATEMENT OF NEED
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) missile maintenance
delay time standards are not being met at this time.
Missiles which go into the pipeline and require repair at the
depot level are out of service for 200-300 days as opposed to
the 150-175 days allowed by the delay standards. The actual
time spent on maintenance is estimated to be about five days
at the intermediate maintenance site and 15-25 days at the
depot site. The rest of the time is consumed by various
delays such as awaiting maintenance and awaiting transporta-
tion. If turnaround time can be reduced, asset readiness
will be improved. [Ref. 1]
Asset readiness is the driving force behind efforts to
reduce the length of the pipeline. The CNO has established
Asset Readiness Objectives (AROs) which are the desired
levels of Ready-f or-Issue (RFI) missiles in the inventory.
ASSET READINESS RATIO = Number of RFI Missiles
Total Number of Missiles
There is a good deal of concern about the delay time in
the maintenance pipeline because the present inventory is
expected to triple by 1991. In addition, six new missile
types are projected to be added to the inventory over the
next five years. These changes present an opportunity to
make changes in the missile maintenance pipeline to reduce
the turnaround time.
The missile maintenance program is a major budgetary
item. Missile costs range from around $50,000 per missile to
over $1,000,000 per missile. Current maintenance costs for
personnel are estimated at $25-30M per year, with the total
man-hour workload projected to grow from approximately
450,000 man-hours in 1986 to over 1,300,000 man-hours for
1991. Over $130,000,000 in military construction has been
requested for the next five years for storage and production
facilities. [Ref. 2]
The basis for the missile maintenance pipeline has come
from the maintenance programs for other types of ordnance
such as torpedoes and mines. Maintenance support for a
specific missile was designed without a coordinated approach
to the other missile systems. This was not necessary when
there were relatively few missile types, but with the
increasing number of missiles and their increasing
complexity, it is necessary to plan for growth in the system.
There are not enough production and storage facilities to
meet the future need. More will be required. The same is
true for the production workers. This maintenance program
has grown so rapidly that the reason for doing things in a
certain way may no longer be valid. To minimize the cost of
operation, it is time to closely examine what is being done
and to try out ideas that show promise for reducing
turnaround time, increasing asset readiness and reducing the
maintenance burden.
Asset readiness has become increasingly important with
the rising cost of missiles and the enactment of the Gramm-
Rudman Bill. These factors may well limit the number of
missiles that can be procured and force us to keep existing
missiles in a high state of availability.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to identify ways to reduce
the maintenance turnaround time and increase asset readiness
of air-launched missiles. An important objective is to make
people aware that this program is a major concern and
requires attention and planning now. The study will look at
the maintenance system as a whole and attempt to identify
bottlenecks and areas of deficiencies and make recommenda-
tions to resolve them.
C. BACKGROUND
The maintenance pipeline is the maintenance and logistics
system by which non-RFI (Ready-f or-Issue) missiles are made
RFI. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM AIR-418) is the
Navy command responsible for the maintenance and logistic
support of Air-Launched Missiles (ALMs). NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-
418) does not own any missile maintenance or support
facilities. These tasks are delegated to other commands,
e.g., transportation and supply to Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP); intermediate maintenance to Naval Sea
Systems command (NAVSEA); depot maintenance to Naval Air
Rework Facilities with NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-418) providing
management for the program. [Ref. 10: p.- 2-1-1]
The missile maintenance pipeline is designed to ensure
that missiles receive periodic testing to screen out failures
and return the failures to operational condition. Reasons
for missiles to be inducted into the maintenance pipeline
include:
* Failing built-in tests or an operational check while
loaded aboard an aircraft.
* Reaching the missile's Maintenance Due Date (MDD).
* Being captive carried aboard an aircraft. This means
that the missile is loaded onto an aircraft and flown.
* Being damaged in some other manner such as being dropped
or exposed to salt water.
The air-launched missile inventory is currently composed
of nine different missile types. Four of these will be
phased out in the next five years. The inventory for the
remaining systems is expected to triple and six new missile





















The majority of the research for this study was done at
the intermediate maintenance level at the three Weapons
Stations that work on air-launched missiles. They are the
central point of the missile maintenance system, having the
greatest activity with respect to missile testing and repair.
All air-launched missiles are sent to a weapon station and
must satisfactorily complete testing before being issued to
fleet units .
The missile systems examined are the SPARROW, SIDEWINDER,
PHOENIX, and HARPOON. They were selected because they
represent a large portion of the Navy's total air-launch
missile inventory. They are well established programs that
are expected to comprise a large portion of the inventory for
a number of years to come.
This study follows the path of those missiles that fail
because of their guidance and control (G&C) sections.
Approximately 90% of all missile failures are caused by G&C
sections [Refs. 2, 3, and 5 ] . The rocket motors, warheads,
and superstructure of the missile are very reliable and
result in very few failures. The primary Naval Weapons
Stations associated with ALM maintenance are located at
Yorktown VA, Concord CA, and Fallbrook CA.
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The research for this report was primarily collected by
interviewing weapon station personnel at Concord, Fallbrook,
and Yorktown. There is little statistical data available to
support the report because information has not been
maintained on turnaround times except at the weapon stations
on an individual basis. The data collected by the individual
weapon stations does not use the same measurements.
The central conflict for the ALM maintenance pipeline is
to determine which has greater priority, asset readiness or
efficiency and economy of the maintenance pipeline. Both
sides have valid arguments which deserve closer inspection.
E. SCOPE
The remainder of the report is divided into five
sections. Each of these sections is briefly described to
orient the reader and to assist in locating pertinent
information .
Section II presents a more detailed look at the ALM
maintenance pipeline. The role of the major commands
involved is defined. System operation is described. This
section provides background to the reader which may be
necessary for understanding subsequent chapters.
Section III presents the major findings and
recommendations of the report. Major findings and
recommendations have been included as early as possible to
allow evaluation of the report with a minimum of effort.
12
Section IV provides a breakdown by functional area where
opportunities are for reducing delays and overall turnaround
time .
Section V presents some ideas to the reader with the
intent of promoting some free thinking of what "could be
done . "
Section VI summarizes the study and includes recommenda-
tions for further research.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MISSILE MAINTENANCE PIPELINE
A. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
NAVAIR (AIR-418) is the Navy command responsible for the
logistics support of ALMs. Its function is the management
(planning, programming, directing, and control) of field
activities to accomplish specific tasks to fulfill this
mission. Included in the mission is the responsibility for
the maintenance of the ALMs. NAVAIR (AIR-418) does not own
any maintenance facilities or support activities and
delegates other commands to provide the support required
(e.g., transportation and supply support from the Naval
Supply Systems command (NAVSUP) and maintenance support from
the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).
The other major activity involved in the maintenance
pipeline is the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC), Point
Mugu, California. PMTC is designated as the Maintenance
Engineering Activity for ALMs except WALLEYE. It provides
support to NAVAIR Headquarters for basic design and
maintenance engineering, and production support functions.
It also provides type' commanders with engineering and
technical services for advice, instruction, and training in
the installation, operation, maintenance and modification of
airborne weapons and associated Weapons Support Equipment
(WSE). The major function at the weapon station level is
performing the ALM workload coordinating function and
14
conducting ALM and WSE technical proficiency evaluations of
Navy intermediate and depot level industrial facilities.
[Ref. 10: p. 1-1-5]
The maintenance support is organized into three levels
for air-launched missiles: namely organizational, inter-
mediate, and depot level.
Organizational maintenance is the lowest level of repair
and usually means a fleet operational squadron either onboard
an aircraft carrier or at a Naval Air Station. Known as "0"
level maintenance, it consists primarily of assembly and
disassembly of the weapon. It involves no internal
maintenance of the missile and only very limited surface
maintenance. Limited tests, such as continuity and seeker
head checks, are performed aboard aircraft at the organiza-
tional level.
Intermediate maintenance (or "I" level) is performed at
Naval Weapon Stations (NWS), also known as IMAs (Intermediate
Maintenance Activities). This maintenance level consists of
testing and component replacement. The weapon station is the
central point for the pipeline. All new production,
reworked, and fleet return weapons must successfully complete
testing at the weapon station before being issued for use.
Missiles are tested as A
1
1-Up-Round s (AURs) at the weapon
station. This means that all missile sections are assembled
to form a complete missile before any testing is done. [Ref.
1]
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Depot level maintenance is performed at NARFs (Naval Air
Rework Facilities) and contractors' plants. These depot
level maintenance facilities are also known as Designated
Overhaul Points (DOPs). This is the most extensive level of
repair. It consists of diagnostic testing and detailed
component and subcomponent repair of assemblies and sections
that failed testing at the weapon station. These maintenance
facilities are widely dispersed across the United States.
B. SYSTEM OPERATIONS
As an aircraft carrier is preparing to deploy, a weapons
load-out request is sent from the carrier to the weapons
stations. The stations prepare the load-out of missiles by
selecting missiles from their RFI inventory with 12 months
remaining before their maintenance due dates (MDDs). If
enough missiles are not on hand, the stations will rearrange
their workloads to provide the additional missiles.
When the missiles are loaded aboard the carrier, one of
three things will happen. The missile will be:
1. placed into deep stowage in its container;
2. taken out of its container and built up in the Ready
Service locker ;
3. removed from container, built up, loaded onto an
aircraft and captive flown. (Capfve flown means
that the weapon is loaded aboard the aircraft,
which is launched and recovered, without firing
the missile.)
The prime contributor to missile failures onboard the
carrier is being captive flown. All missiles that are
captive flown must be sent to a weapon station for testing.
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There are different limits for the number of flight hours or
launches and recoveries determining how long each missile
type may be flown before being down-loaded and considered
Material Condition Code E, Unserviceable (repairable).
[Refs. 2, 3, and 5]
1 . Missile Pre-sentencing Inspection
A Missile Pre-sentencing Inspection (MPI) team is
sent to the ship 2-4 weeks before the end of the deployment.
The mission of these teams is to inventory all missiles
onboard and determine which ones need to be sent back to the
weapons station for maintenance at the end of the deployment
and which ones may be cross-decked to another ship or
station. These teams are composed of representatives of the
Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA (PMTC) and the
respective weapons stations. [Ref. 7]
These teams are sent to the carriers with a master
inventory list for the missiles that should be r board that
particular carrier. They physically sight either the missile
or its documentation to make sure that the master inventory
list is accurate and decide any questionable cases. Quite
often, there are numerous discrepancies on the master list.
Missiles that require maintenance or testing are consolidated
into shipping containers for transport to the weapon
stations. Color-coded tags are attached to the containers
for easy recognition and sorting. [Refs. 3 and 5]
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2.
Transport from Ship to Weapon Station
Missiles that do not require maintenance or testing
are cross-decked to another carrier. Some missiles that
require maintenance are sent back to the weapon stations on a
space available basis on either ships or aircraft. This
amounts to less than 2 % of all missiles that require
maintenance from the carrier.
3
.
Arrival at the Weapon Station
The missiles requiring maintenance are usually cross-
decked to an ammunition ship for delivery to a weapon station
or a port where the missiles can be shipped to a station.
The missiles are off-loaded and again inventoried, this time
for receipt. After the weapon is inventoried on the pier or
loading dock by station quality assurance people, the weapon
is placed into temporary or permanent storage. Permanent
storage is a magazine. Temporary storage might be a shed or




The form used to record the data which tells the
station that a particular missile is onboard is the DD-1348,
which is a shipping document. This form is sent to the A D &
C
(Ammunition Distribution and Control), where the paperwork is
turned into a data entry for the NO MIS (Naval Ordnance
Management Information System) report.
The NO MIS report has two forms. There is a monthly
form that lists every missile that is physically aboard the
station and what its status is. The second form is a daily
NO MIS report which only lists the missiles that have had a
change in status. No scheduling of work may be done until
the missile's paperwork has been processed and the production
people notified of its location and status. This commonly
takes 3-4 weeks. The reasons given for this delay include
heavy workload, inexperienced personnel due to high turnover,
the large quantity of missiles that arrive at one time, and
the large amount of data entry that is required for each
missile. [ Ref . 5 ]
The receiving inventory reports are known for being
inaccurate as well as" late. One thing that could be done to
reduce this delay is to have the station use a copy of the
master list that is sent with the pre-sentencing team to
enter applicable data before the missiles arrive at the
station. When the team completes their work, a message could
be sent to modify the master list. This would reduce the
off-load paperwork to an exception-only basis and reduce the
time from weapon arrival until notification of production
personnel that the missiles are on station.
5 . Workload Scheduling
Once a missile is known to be on the station, the
weapon is scheduled for maintenance. This is done by the
station planning personnel. The scheduling of missile
testing and repair has several variables that determine the
order of induction. Some of the variables include the asset
readiness ratio for a particular missile type and the
priority need for a missile type to complete carrier
load-out
.
Two major planning conferences are held each year
between the NAVAIR (AIR-418) people, Pacific Missile Test
Center (PMTC) and weapon station representatives. The
purpose of the first conference is to determine how much work
will be assigned to each station and when the work is
expected to arrive. The work assignment is based on
competition and a "fair share" principle. The fair share
principle essentially divides the missiles according to the
projected needs of t.hree commands, CINCLANTFLT, CINCNAV-
EUROPE, and CINCPACFLT. Each missile type is only worked at
one site per coast. The second conference is the mid-year
review, which is used to make adjustments as necessary to the
previous schedule. [Ref. 6]
6 . Into Maintenance
Production at the weapon stations is seldom a
continuous process for any missile type. This is due to the
lack of test equipment, test cells, and production workers to
keep all missile repair lines open continuously. The weapon
stations are not allowed a backlog to ensure a constant flow
of work. They are driven by the delay standard for inducting
missiles into maintenance and the need to maintain the asset
readiness levels.
At Concord, only HARPOONs and SPARROWs are worked and
each have their own production building so work is nearly
continuous. Weapons are scheduled by priority for a
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particular model, such as the AIM-7F or -7M, for SPARROW.
Fallbrook repairs all the other types of ALMs for the West
Coast. Yorktown maintains every ALM type in the inventory
for the East Coast.
Another factor that determines when a missile will be
worked is the funding for the maintenance. If a station has
not been funded to perform maintenance on SIDEWINDERS for a
given quarter or if they have already spent their allotted
funds for the quarter, no more SIDEWINDERS will be worked
unless there is a priority demand, an additional funding, or
the Commanding Officer of the station gives station money to
the project. The last is usually done only when a program
has run out of funds prior to completing their assigned
quota. [Ref. 4]
When the missile is ready to be inducted into
maintenance, it is brought to the production facility in its
container. Missiles are usually broken out in lots that
represent a week's production output. This varies at the
different stations with the availability of assets to move
missiles around the stations. The missiles are taken out of
their containers as assembled all-up-rounds (AURs), and
tested as an AUR.
The purpose of the test is to determine if the weapon
meets operational standards or whether it needs repair. If a
missile passes this test, it is considered an up round and
given a Condition Code A, Serviceable (Issue without Qualifi-
cation). Corrosion work or cosmetic work may be done to the
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missile as long as no connections are required to be undone.
The missile is put in its container, has its paperwork
updated and is given a new MDD before being put back in the
magazine awaiting issue. Once the missile has been
designated Code A, it is ready-for-issue and no longer
considered in the maintenance pipeline. These steps are
recorded on the Maintenance Data System (MDS) form. This
form is a step-by-step record of the assembly, disassembly,
and maintenance of the missile. It also tells which
components are used to make up the round. Each component
section of a missile has its own serial number. A complete
round is usually identified by the serial number of the
guidance and control sections. A report is required every
time that the missile's condition code changes.
7 . Failed Sections
If a missile fails a test, it is usually retested on
a different test set. If the missile fails a second test,
the repair process begins. The first step is to locate the
section that is causing the failure. When the section or
component causing the failure is identified, it is removed
from the missile and replaced with a spare from the rotable
pool or a component removed (cannibalized) from another
missile if one is available. The missile is then retested.
If it passes, it is considered a Condition Code A missile and
put in its container. If the missile fails testing again,
the process of locating the failure continues until the
weapon is back in serviceabale condition. If no spares are
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available, the missile is disassembled, put into component
containers, and returned to storage in Condition Code G,
Unserviceable (Incomplete). It must be inducted into
maintenance again when a spare becomes available.
8
.
Weapons Quality Engineering Centers
Weapons Quality Engineering Centers (WQECs) are used
to verify suspicious failures. They have more accurate and
elaborate test equipment than the production facilities do.
They will test a missile and determine whether the failure of
the weapon is accurate or if it is a false reject. A false
reject is a failure caused by an inaccurate test set. WQEC
also performs quality monitoring functions to provide an
assessment of weapon and component stockpile readiness,
service life measurements, measurements of degradation and
analysis of factors adversely affecting weapon quality, reli-
ability and serviceability. [Ref. 10: p. 1-1-6]
9
.
Awaiting Shipment to Depot Maintenance
The failed components that are removed from the
weapon are put into component containers and placed in
storage waiting for shipment to a DOP. The DOPs are NARFs
Norfolk and Alameda and prime contractors such as McDonnell-
Douglas for HARPOON and Raytheon and Ford-Philco for
SIDEWINDER. The contractors are used as the DOP when a new
missile type or model is introduced until the NARFs are ready
to assume the depot level maintenance. [Ref. 1]
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10 . Transportation to Depot Maintenance
Transportation to the DOP is normally provided
through the supply system. A missile leaving the station at
Concord to be repaired at NARF Alameda would be sent to Naval
Supply Center (NSC) Oakland. It would remain there until
NARF Alameda needed more sections to work. NARF Alameda
would then requisition the needed sections through the supply
system. Once the section is repaired at the NARF it is sent
back through the supply system to NSC Oakland as a Code A
section. Code A guidance and control sections are considered
equivalent rounds and no longer count against the asset
readiness objectives.
One notable exception to this transportation system
is the HARPOON missile. The HARPOON maintenance program was
taking too long to get a missile section through the DOP at
the McDonnell-Douglas facility in Missouri. Much of the time
was being spent waiting for transportation to the DOP. To
speed up the process, a dedicated transportation system was
established to do nothing but move HARPOON missile sections
between the weapon stations and the DOP. This system is
composed of one tractor and four trailers. The truck leaves
the DOP with a trailer of Code A missiles and drives to NWS
Concord where it drops off the good missiles and picks up a
trailer already loaded with sections needing repair. This
trailer is driven to the DOP where it is dropped and a load
of good sections picked up for NWS Yorktown. The tractor
switches trailers again and completes the figure eight.
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The tractor arrives at each station once in a two-
week period. Using the dedicated transport, it takes about
36 hours to drive from Concord to the DOP, with the time
being less between Yorktown and the DOP. Under this system,
the average turnaround time for HARPOON s requiring DOP
maintenance from Yorktown has dropped from 244 days to 166
days based on in-process time monthly averages. [Refs. 1, 2,
and 5]
1 1 . Maintenance at Depot Level
When the failed sections arrive at the DOP, they
undergo detailed diagnostic testing and repair. The repair
process at the DOP is continuous for the different missile
types. The DOPs are allowed to work with a backlog to ensure
a steady work flow. When maintenance is complete, the
sections are given a Condition Code A and put back into the
supply system for return to the weapon stations. Once the
sections are back at the station they are used as spares to
repair other missiles. The spares are used to build AURs
which are then tested, put into containers, and returned to
storage Code A. Once the missile is given a Condition Code
A, it is considered out of the maintenance pipeline.
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III. MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following subsections describe the major findings of
this study and provide r ec o ra ra e nd a t io ns to help eliminate
deficiencies. There are several areas where changes could be
made that would reduce the amount of time that a missile is
in the pipeline. The following areas are given special
mention because I believe that they could provide large
improvements in pipeline effectiveness and because the
recommendations would be relatively inexpensive to initiate.
They would be easy to implement on a trial basis for a single
program or station.
A. INACCURACY OF INVENTORY REPORTS
Throughout the maintenance system, the largest complaint
is the inaccuracy of the inventory reports. The majority of
the inaccuracy is caused by the delay in getting information
entered into the Conventional Ammunition Integrated
Management System (CAIMS) reports. Inputs for CAIMS come
from:
- Ammunition Transaction Reports (ATRs) from aircraft
carriers and ammunition ships. These reports are
sent out by message.
- Naval Ordnance Management Information System (NOMIS)
reports from weapons stations.
- Transaction Item Reports (TIRs) from Navy and Marine
Corps Air Stations, Naval Air Rework Facilities
(NARFs) and Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC).
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All of these reports are first handwritten and then
entered into a computerized format. There is commonly a 2-4
week lag time between the actual transaction and the time
that it appears in the CAIMS report. The CAIMS report is
used to determine what the asset readiness for the system is
and the priority for missiles to enter maintenance.
The CAIMS system is being upgraded. The improvements
include a system of 41 reporting points in the repair
process. The reporting points are specific maintenance
actions that will give a clearer picture of where time is
being spent in the pipeline. To assist the system, the OMS
system is being added. This system will use bar coding on
the various missile sections and a bar code reader for data
entry. The first installations are to begin in the summer of
1986 with the entire system becoming operational in 1989.
[Ref. 1 ]
In the interim, there are some actions that could be
taken to reduce the amount of data entry required. These
actions should be easy to implement and require little
funding
.
1) A comprehensive review of required reports needs to be
made to eliminate,' simplify, and combine as many of the
reports as possible to avoid redundancies and purge the
system of requirements that are no longer valid. This
method would be especially applicable to older programs
such as SPARROW and SIDEWINDER and the programs that
are to be phased out. These programs have large
historical data bases and trends are well established.
Records kept would be limited to essential information
only
.
2) Reduce the backlogs that occur when a carrier off-load
arrives at a weapon station by entering as much
27
information as possible beforehand. The off-loads
flood the Ammunition Distribution and Control offices
at the stations with paperwork to be entered into the
computers. Much of the information is available
through the master inventory lists that the Missile
Pre-sentencing Inspection teams are given by Fleet
Analysis Center (FLTAC) before their inspections.
3) Have the inspection teams send messages from the ship
for any changes that are expected on the master list.
4) Hire additional data entry personnel.
B. TEST EQUIPMENT AND CELLS
There are bottlenecks at Fallbrook and Yorktown caused by
shortages of test equipment or test cells. All cells are
scheduled for 100% use during normal working hours. At
Concord the two SPARROW test sets and cells are fully
scheduled but the two HARPOON cells are used to about 50% of
normal capacity and there is a fifth cell in a separate
building that is not in use. [Refs. 7, 8, and 9]
This is a limiting factor for the entire pipeline. The
system cannot push missiles through any faster, regardless of
what is done with the rest of the pipeline. There are four
alternatives :
1) Increase the amount of test time that is available by
obtaining more test sets.
2) Operate the test sets longer hours.
3) Shorten the testing time. Tests for the SPARROW
missile take approximately one hour to run. If the
time could be reduced to 25 minutes, then the number of
missiles that could be put through the cell in one day
would increase.
4) Reduce the amount of testing that must be done on a
missile. This could be done by increasing the time
between maintenance for missiles. It could also be
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accomplished by testing sample batches of missiles out
of depot maintenance and new construction instead of
testing every missile.
A word of caution should be included. Because of the
critical mission of :he missii -S, it is important that any
changes in the testing procedures or any' other procedure do
not affect the performance of the end item. If the increases
in the output of the maintenance pipeline are offset by
decreased reliability in the missile, nothing has been gained
and aircrews and their aircraft have been jeopardized. Any
changes to the maintenance system must be well engineered to
ensure continued quality and reliability of performance. The
main purpose of the maintenance program is to provide
missiles that will perform their mission. Any other con-
siderations are strictly secondary in nature.
C. LACK OF PRIDE AMONG PRODUCTION PERSONNEL
There is a lack of pride among many of the production
workers. They are not held responsible for their work. The
responsibility is held by the Quality Assurance inspectors.
Because the workers are not held accountable, they have no
incentive to improve their performance. The industrial
standards that are allowed are generous yet they frequently
are not met. The exception to this lack of pride and concern
seemed to be at Fallbrook. Fallbrook has an extensive




I recommend that the production workers be organized into
small teams and that the responsibility for the work
performed be given to the team leader. The Quality Assurance
inspector would only inspect highly unusual tasks or the most
critical tasks. This would do four things:
1) It would give the workers much more responsibility for
their work
.
2) It would give them more pride of ownership for the work
that they do.
3) It would increase the accountability for the work that
was being performed.
4) It would be easier to identify workers who were
inadequately trained or unmotivated, and would increase
the number of workers available for production by
decreasing the number devoted to Q.A.
D. INEFFICIENT PRODUCTION METHODS
I feel that the delay time standard for inducting
missiles into maintenance within 15 days of arriving at the
weapon station may be detrimental to the goal of higher asset
readiness and lower operating costs for the stations. There
is little opportunity to realize any benefit from the
learning curve. Set-up times are increased when production
is shifted from one type of missile to another on a weekly
basis
.
Repair at the intermediate level is essentially a
straightforward, manual labor production process. Most of
the operations are common to every missile. As a production
run continues, there should be a reduction in the amount of
time that it takes to accomplish these standard operations,
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the learning curve effect. Because the production lines are
shut down and switched every 1-2 weeks, much, if not all, of
this gain is nullified. The purpose of the delay time
standard is to move missiles through the maintenance pipeline
quickly and keep asset readiness high.
If this delay standard were not enforced and missile
types were worked continuously for several weeks, I believe
that the overall asset readiness would increase. More
missiles could be worked because the average time to perform
the maintenance would be decreased. With fewer set-up
changes, there would be more production time available.
Although a particular missile type might dip below its asset
readiness objective, the other missiles in production would
be far enough above their objectives that overall readiness
would be higher .
This program would probably save money by reduced man-
hours spent on equipment set-up. Other benefits that might
be realized include: the economy of moving all the missiles
out of one magazine, and having full truckloads of missiles
to ship instead of partial shipments.
E. DEDICATED TRANSPORTATION
One area that has shown great promise for reducing delay
time is dedicated transportation. Dedicated transportation
means that a long-term agreement is made with a trucking
company to provide regularly scheduled transport service
exclusively to carry a particular type of missile between
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points. For example, having a truck pick up a load of
SIDEWINDER missiles from a particular weapon station every
Friday and deliver them to a particular DOP on Monday
morning.
Dedicated transportation for the HARPOON program reduced
turnaround time through the DOP by an average of 50 days over
a six-month period through January of 1986. This might also
be done with other missile programs, particularly the more
expensive missiles. This program is expensive but by
reducing the pipeline 50 days it reduced the number of
missiles in the pipeline by around 20%.
F. RECOMMENDATION
1 . Eliminate Delay Time Standards
One recommendation would be that the term "delay time
standard" be replaced by the term "productivity standard."
At first glance this would appear to have little or no effect
on the amount of time that a missile spends in the
maintenance pipeline. However, if a "delay standard" exists
for a portion of the pipeline, there will be a delay. It is
expected to occur, so it will occur. If the term "produc-
tivity standard" is used, it implies a goal to be met. This
becomes a challenge and encourages people to find ways to
eliminate delays.
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IV. POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. GENERAL
The pipeline has room for improvement in several areas
including personnel, transportation, facilities, data
collection, and production. There are opportunities to
reduce the turnaround time and to implement ideas that will
accommodate the growth of the missile maintenance programs.
Change in one area may well mean that another area will have
to change. Suggestions in this chapter are not a
comprehensive list, just the more notable ones. Many systems
sufficient for the past have been outgrown. Restructuring is
needed to improve the performance of the pipeline.
B. PERSONNEL
Maintenance performed in the pipeline is labor intensive.
The only operations that are automated are the tests
performed on the missiles and their components. At Yorktown
and Fallbrook all workers are civilians. Concord has some
Navy personnel assigned to limited areas of production such
as wing and fin repair, rocket motor repair, container
repair, and some test monitoring. The issues in personnel
are :
1) A lack of pride and motivation among many of the
production workers.




1 . Lack of Pride and Motivation
Many of the production workers do not seem to take
pride in their work. Some of this may be attributable to the
tedious nature of some of the tasks and the lax time
standards that are given to complete work. The main factor
appears to be that the workers feel no responsibility for or
identity with the work they do. Their work is certified by a
Quality Assurance r ep r e se n t a t i ve w . It is the Q.A. rep who
takes the responsibility for the work and puts his stamp on
the missile. The production workers learn the tolerances of
the different Q.A. inspectors and gauge their work to pass
the inspection. The workers feel no pride of ownership in
the work performed. [Refs. 2 and 5]
Several people interviewed were familiar with all the
weapon stations and felt that the workers at Fallbrook showed
the most interest and concern for their work. Fallbrook has
approximately half the number of workers as the other
stations. Every production worker is put through an
extensive training program. At the completion of that
training program the workers are qualified to perform every
maintenance task performed on each type of air-launched
missile worked at the station and are rotated on a regular
basis. It takes 4-5 years to become fully qualified on all
systems .
Recommendations:
1) Give the responsibility for the work to the workers who
perform it. Organize the workers into small teams that
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would work the missiles through the production process
from start to finish. The group supervisor would be
responsible for the work performed on the missile and
would sign off the work performed. Q.A. inspectors
would be used only for extraordinary cases.
2) Adopt the Fallbrook training and rotation program at
other stations. This would provide the workers with a
broader range of experience. Techniques used on one
program might carry over to another.
2 . Low Pay for Test Equipment Repair Technicians
One issue at Yorktown was that test equipment repair
technicians were hired by private industry as soon as they
became qualified. They were being hired away because their
pay is low with regard to the industry standards in the area.
Recommendation:
Raise the wage grade for these technicians at Yorktown.
C. FACILITIES
The facilities in the system are loaded to capacity.
They will be inadequate with the increase in size of the
inventory and the introduction of new missile systems.
Fallbrook and Yorktown both seemed to have critical shortages
of production and storage space. In interviews with PMTC
representatives at Yorktown, they felt that the station would
have to turn work away by 1989 due to a lack of space. The
station is currently using rail cars for storage of missiles.
[Ref. 2]
Some of the facilities deficiencies for the stations
include :
1) A shortage of test equipment /test cells.
2) Shortages of missile magazine space.
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3) Shortage of production facility space.
4) Lack of a receiving facility at NARFs so that missile
sections could be shipped direct between the weapon
stations and the NARF.
1 . Test Equipment/Test Cells
A critical deficiency at the weapon station level is
the limited availability of test equipment and test cells.
The test cells at the stations, with the exception of
Concord, are scheduled for 100% use during working hours.
Concord has five test cells, one of which is idle. The two
cells used for SPARROW are in use 100% of the time.
Estimated use of the two HARPOON cells is 50% of the time.
If a WALLEYE is being tested, no missiles may be tested in
adjacent cells because of explosive limits. This further
limits the amount of test cell time that is available.
Production is bottlenecked at this point and the turnaround
time for the entire pipeline cannot be reduced until more
testing capability is realized. [Refs. 2, 4, 5 and 8]
Recommendations:
1) Buy more test equipment and build more test cells.
This will have to be done eventually.
2) Reduce the length of the tests that are run to increase
the rate of testing. The test for SPARROW missiles
takes about one hour to run. If this test could be
shortened to 25 minutes, the number of missiles that
could be tested on one test set would increase.
3) Improve the test equipment so that more accurate repair
is possible and repeated retest is reduced.
4) Reduce the number of missiles which must be tested.
This could be accomplished by increasing the length of
the SIST or by not testing every new construction and
reworked missile. All missile sections coming out of
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new production or rework are tested as AURs before
being issued for use. The acceptance rate for some
missile systems is greater than 95% during this testing
[Ref. 5]. If all missiles were retested the next day,
they would probably have the same failure rate. I
propose that for long-term, stable programs this
testing be done in sample batches and not done for
every missile unless there is a major change to the
raissi le .
5) Operate the test equipment for longer hours. At
present, they are normally scheduled for operating one
shift per day
.
6) Obtain a DSM-156 test set for SPARROW and put it in one
of the HARPOON cells at Concord. Bring the WALLEYE
maintenance to Concord and set it up in the building
with the single test cell.
2 . Magazine Space
There is a physical shortage of magazine space.
Yorktown is presently storing missiles in rail cars. When a
magazine is at 80% of its capacity, it is considered full
because it is difficult to efficiently inove weapons in and
out
.
The magazine space that does exist was built to
accommodate conventional ordnance, not missile containers.
On the older magazines the doors are so narrow that two
forklifts are required to move the missiles around. One
forklift is used exclusively outside the magazine to unload
missiles off the truck and bring them to the door where they
are turned lengthwise to fit through the door. The exterior
forklift then repositions and lifts the containers lengthwise
and moves them inside the building where the other lift picks
them up in the normal fashion and stacks them for storage.
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This maneuvering probably takes two to three times as long as
Lt would with doors that were the proper width. [Ref. 4]
These two factors create difficulty in rotating stock
and increase the costs of moving missiles into and out of
storage. A study was made a few years back and it was
determined that it would be less expensive to build new
magazines with wide doors than to widen the doors of the
existing magazines. [Ref. 5]
Recommendations:
1) Build new missile magazines. For FY 1988-1992, the
Program Objectives Memorandum requests for weapon
station Military Construction total $130,000,000, of
which $105,000,000 is for magazine construction. None
of this money has been approved in the Five-Year
Defense Plan yet.
2) Replace conventional magazine doors with missile doors.
This option was looked at before. At the time, it was
felt that it would be more expensive to do this than to
build new magazines. This may have changed since the
study was done. The magazines will be needed. Storing
missiles on rail cars is unacceptable as a safety risk
and as a potential target for terrorists.
3 . Production Space
The difficulty in moving weapons in and out of
magazines and a shortage of trucks to move missiles onboard
the stations lead to the need for increased production space.
If moving missiles onboard a station were easy, missiles to
be inducted into maintenance could be broken out on a daily
basis. At Yorktown, a week's worth of missiles are brought
out at one time, making it necessary to have room on the
production floor for the entire week's workload.
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Production facilities are limited by the explosive
weight of the weapons on the floor. Explosive weight is
measured as the warhead weight plus a percentage of the solid
rocket motor. Certain missiles, such as WALLEYEs and
HARPOONs, may not be worked on at the same time because the
explosive weight of the production run exceeds the explosive
limits of the facility.
Recommendation:
1) Improve the magazines and the on-station handling
ability and the need for increased production space
would be reduced until the new missile types comes into
the inventory. Each missile type should have its own
test cell so that test equipment does not need to be
moved. WALLEYEs should be worked in separate buildings
so that other test cells are not rendered unusable for
significant periods of time.
4 . NARF Receiving Facility
Another facility shortage is the lack of a receiving
facility at the NARFs. All weapon components that are sent
to the NARFs must be routed through the supply system.
Missile components from NWS Concord must be sent to NSC
Oakland, where they are stored until the NARF is ready for
more work and they requisition the components. This occurs
both coming to and returning from the NARFs on both coasts.
This causes delays because it doubles the number of times
that the sections must be handled. I believe a month could
be removed from the turnaround time if the NWS and the NARF
could ship missiles directly to each other if the rest of the
system could accommodate the change.
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Recommendation :
Build a receiving facility at the NARFs so that material
may be shipped directly between the weapon station and the
NARFs.
D. TRANSPORTATION
The transportation area is of particular interest because
of the large potential for reducing turnaround times.
Transportation is required to move weapons:
- from where they are deployed overseas back to the U.S.
- from the ships that return them to the U.S. to the weapon
stations where they are repaired.
- aboard the weapon stations.
- between the weapon stations and the DOPs and back to the
stations .
Transportation opportunity areas include:
1) Returning missiles that fail while on deployment to the
U.S.
2) Inconvenience to trucking companies.
3) Authority to ship missiles and components is not given
to the individual stations, but is controlled by an
inventory manager for each missile type in Washington,
D.C.
1 . Return of Deployed Missiles
Off-loads from aircraft carriers occur 2-3 times per
year for each coast. The failure rate for missiles is fairly
constant throughout the duration of the cruise. The time
that these failed weapons are carried around on the carriers
is not being considered in the pipeline measurements but
should be. The Navy has tried to return these weapons on a
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space available basis but it is estimated that less than 2 %
of the failures are returned in this manner. [Ref. 6]
Recommendation:
Use MSC ships or rotate ammunition ships to bring
failed missiles back halfway through the deployment.
2 . Inconvenience to Trucking Companies
Many commercial trucking companies are reluctant to
do business with the government. The reason for this is the
extra requirements and paperwork that the government
requires. The paperwork is more detailed and complicated
than that used by commercial shippers. Many of the forms
provide redundant information. These forms require more
office work and lead to longer delays. Some of the other
requirements include:
1. Two drivers for each vehicle.
2. Tarps to cover the missiles.
3. Carrying firearms for protection against terrorists.
Another reason that trucking firms are reluctant to
haul missiles is that their trucks and trailers can be tied
up for weeks waiting for full loads. The Navy places a
standard DOD transportation priority on the movement of
unserviceable Code F missiles. As a result, the missiles are
not shipped with less than a full truckload.
This can lead to delays in two ways. One is, the
truck can be filled with other items that do not have the
same destination, so the missiles can be delayed for weeks
while the truck delivers the rest of its load. The second
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way is for the truck to wait to be filled with missiles. The
current method of processing missiles is not a continuous
production line. It may be several weeks before that
particular missile type is worked again. In the interim, the
trailer may sit waiting to fill out the load. This may not
be cost effective considering the high cost of these
missiles .
Recommendation:
Use dedicated transportation on a fixed schedule as the
HARPOON program is doing. This is an area that has demon-
strated potential for reducing delay time.
3 . Authority to Ship
The stations do not have the authority to ship
missiles requiring WQEC verification on their own. The
missile type inventory manager in Washington D.C. holds that
authority. Missiles waiting for shipment to WQEC for verifi-
cation must remain at the station until the inventory manager
approves the shipment or until the missiles have waited 30
days for that approval. The station normally ships the
missiles after 30 days without receiving the approval.
Approximately 5-10% of all new and reworked missiles require
this verification. [Ref. 5]
Recommendation:




The production processes at the weapon stations show some
possible improvements. The areas that appear to provide the
best opportunities for performance improvement are:
1) Length of production.
2) Production layouts.
1 . Length of Production Run
The length of production runs is at the heart of a
conflict between NAVAIR and NAVSEA. NAVAIR wants to maintain
high asset readiness at all times and wants missiles to be
moved into production within 15 days of arriving on station.
This necessitates breaking production runs after one or two
weeks. NAVSEA wants to operate the maintenance pipeline in
as economical a manner as possible. This means long
production runs to avoid disruptions and set-up delays in the
production process.
Recommendation:
Eliminate the delay standard for inducting a missile into
maintenance. Increase the length of the production runs.
The potential increases in production come from the
learning curve effect and the reduction in set-up times for
the test equipment.
2 . Production Layout
The production layouts vary greatly between the
stations. At some stations, the work is confined to a small
area so that everyone is aware of its status. Help is
readily available if a problem develops. At other stations,
the work is spread throughout the building.
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Recommendation:
Try to keep the production area for a missile type in one,
close area. This will keep everyone aware of the work's
status, eliminate excessive movement of the missile and its
components throughout the production facility, and allow
help to be readily available if needed.
F. DATA MANAGEMENT
Performance of the pipeline might also be improved
through some changes in reporting and data management. The
place where improvement is needed is in the accuracy of the
inventory status reports.
The area that provides the most opportunity to improve
asset readiness is in increasing the accuracy of the
inventory reports, such as CAIMS. Most of the inaccuracy is
due to the time delay in getting data entered. In many cases
it takes 3-4 weeks from the time the transaction occurs until
the data is entered into these reports. (Refs. 2, 3 and 5]
All data must first be hand recorded onto a form, then
the form is taken to A,D&C, where it is entered into a
computer data base. Several people interviewed believe this
to be the main obstacle to improving the performance of the
pipeline. Benefits of correcting the reports would include
better planning and better use of available assets.
Recommendations:
1) Eliminate any reporting requirement that is no longer
valid. Simplify and combine what is left to avoid
redundancy. Reduce the workload by reducing the amount
of reporting required.
2) Pre-enter as much data as possible to reduce the work-
load at end of deployment off-loads.
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V. IDEAS FOR CONSIDERATION
This section is included to give the reader something to
contemplate, and to provoke further thought on the subject of
missile readiness and maintenance. The author realizes that
there are many obstacles to the possibilities mentioned, but
that with coordinated effort and wise resource commitment,
some might be of use. A key concept for the reader to keep
in mind is "What are the possibilities?" rather than "What
are the problems?"
A. CREATE A NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEM COMMAND
The missiles in the Navy's inventory are very complicated
and expensive pieces of equipment. They perform a vital role
in national defense. The support system to keep them in
service is extensive and complex. They are deserving of
their own major command.
The advantage of this would be that the entire
maintenance pipeline would be under one command. There would
be no conflict between commands over priorities and how
things should be done. Changes in the system would be easier
to implement because everyone in the system would be working
for the same boss.
B. DEDICATED TRANSPORTATION
Another possibility would be for the Navy to have its own
weapon transportation services rather than hire commercial
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truckers. The transportation of military weapons has been
receiving attention in the press lately for inadequate
security from theft and terrorist action ;. With all the
attention, it won't be long till even more strident
requirements are placed on commercial carriers of the Navy's
missiles. In the long run, it might be less expensive for
the Navy to have its own tractors, trailers and drivers than
to hire these services.
With the media attention, this would probably be the most
opportune time to make a case for the Navy's buying its own
trucking services. It would eliminate having to contract out
each job, obtaining security clearances for the drivers, and
other problems that need to be overcome when purchasing the
transportation from commercial sources. The trucks would
have regular schedules and could operate with less than full
loads. Costs should remain fairly constant regardless of
whether the trailer was full or not. The trucks would only
be used by the NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEM COMMAND. They would
proceed directly to and from the destination instead of
making several intermediate stops to drop off other partial
shipments .
C. ELIMINATE TRANSPORTATION
The current missile maintenance system has never been
tested under full-scale wartime conditions. Missiles did not
exist during World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts were not real tests of war conditions for the U.S.
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at home. During war, transportation is a major concern.
There are many competing demands for the transportation that
is available and the transport systems are susceptible to
attack. The present missile maintenance system is built
around peacetime resources and the author doubts that it
could continue to function during wartime.
The best way to reduce transportation problems is to
eliminate as many of the transportation requirements as
possible. This could be done by building all of the
maintenance facilities at the ports where the ammunition
ships return to CONUS. This would include the intermediate
and depot level maintenance as well as WQEC. The only
transportation requirements would be on station.
This would minimize the amount of facilities and storage
needed by eliminating redundant excess capacity. The number
of administrative personnel, weapons handling personnel,
etc., required would be reduced. Test equipment and skilled
personnel would all be in one location to assist if a problem
or backlog developed. Transportation time would be reduced
to the time required to process the paperwork and move the
missiles across the street.
D. DREDGE THE RIVER
While the author was visiting Fallbrook, he was told:
Several years ago, a land developer in Los Angeles offered
to dredge the river onto the weapon station at Fallbrook so
that ships could come up the river and deliver the missiles
directly to Fallbrook. His asking price for doing this was
the property at Seal Beach Naval Weapon Station. [Ref. 3]
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If the story is true and the offer still stands, perhaps the
Navy should take him up on it. Missiles and weapons that are
maintained at Fallbrook normally first arrive at NWS Concord
and then are shipped to Fallbrook. This can result in delays
of as much as two months from the time the missiles arrive at
Concord until they arrive at Fallbrook.
Another idea proposed is to have helicopters transport
the weapons from the ships while they are at anchor off the
coast. The helicopters used for this type of operation are
home-ported at NAS North Island. The two difficulties to
overcome are overflying Interstate 5 while externally
carrying missiles and transporting the missiles from the
landing pads and runways at Camp Pendleton to the storage
facilities .
E. CHANGE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES
One way to avoid having missiles that fail at the
beginning of the deployment from sitting on the ship till the
end of deployment is to have the ammunition ship rotate at
the middle of the carrier's deployment.
This would do three things:
* It would allow missiles to come back to the maintenance
system sooner so they could be repaired sooner and keep
asset readiness higher.
* It would more evenly distribute the workload 3t the
weapon s tat ion.
* It would allow missiles with little time remaining till
their MDDs to be used more effectively. Instead of
needing 6-12 months remaining till their MDD to be sent
on deployment, a missile could be sent out that had only
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3-4 months. This would allow greater flexibility and
usage of the available missiles and better use of the
missiles since they would not need to be tested as often.
Military Sealift Command ships could also be used to perform
this function .
F. MOVE THE MAINTENANCE PIPELINE TO THE MIDWEST
Another idea would be to move the entire pipeline to
somewhere in the Midwest like Iowa or Nebraska. These people
are losing their livelihood and have never received much
benefit from defense dollars. They know how to work hard and
they are good at repairing farm machinery. They would be
naturals for missile maintenance.
G. EARLY ELIMINATION OF OLDER MISSILES
One way of obtaining more storage and production capacity
would be to eliminate the need for some of it. This could be
done by early retirement of missile types that are scheduled
to be phased out. These weapons are no longer needed because
they have either become obsolete or something better has been
developed. Until they are removed from the system they will
continue to be a drain on the maintenance pipeline's
resources. These missiles could be disposed of or perhaps
sold through Foreign Military Sales.
H. DRAW ON OTHER RESOURCES
One way to reduce the workload on the Navy's maintenance
pipeline would be to use other resources such as the Army's
or the Air Force's capabilities. The Array and Air Force
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inventories contain some of the same missiles as the Navy.
Perhaps there is some excess capacity available which could
be used by the Navy.
The Air Force places its intermediate maintenance
facilities at the same locations as its organizational
maintenance. Every base that has aircraft which carry
missiles has an intermediate facility for maintaining
missiles. Some of these bases are located in the
Philippines, West Germany, and other North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries. If these facilities could be
used to repair some of the Navy's missiles, it would improve
the asset readiness and eliminate large amounts of time that
are consumed returning the weapons to the U.S. Though there
would be administrative problems to be worked out, this
arrangement could be beneficial to both services. Navy
missiles could be kept separate from Air Force missiles to
reduce some of the accounting problems.
I. USE CONTRACTORS TO REPAIR THE MISSILES
An alternative idea would be to have contractors perform
this maintenance. It could be cost effective to contract out
the work rather than to continue the present practice. The
contractors are the most capable of repairing the missiles
that are new or have received a major modification because of
their greater experience. There are often problems when the
Navy assumes the maintenance functions due to lack of spare
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parts and qualified people to repair the missiles, as well as
shortages of facilities.
J. INCREASED ROLES
The role that the Naval Aviation Logistics Center (NALC)
plays could be expanded. Current responsibilities of the
NALC ensure that the NARFs support the depot repair programs
in assigned areas. They provide support to the NARFs in
training, equipment and facility acquisition, quality
assurance, engineering investigation services, and reli-
ability. Perhaps better use could be made of their knowledge
of Naval Aviation logistics. [Ref. 10: p. 1-1-6]
Another resource that might be used are the students and
staff at the Naval Postgraduate School. There is a good
supply of knowledge and manpower to draw from. Perhaps the
missile maintenance pipeline could be used as a continuing




The primary objective of this report is to determine if
there are opportunities to reduce the length of time that a
missile is in the maintenance pipeline. Those opportunities
do exist. There are several areas that have great potential
including transportation, data management, and production
processes. However, no single change appears as a cure-all.
A coordinated and well-engineered plan needs to be developed
that takes the entire system into consideration.
The current methods of operation for the pipeline were
developed with good reason and intention. This may be the
most effective missile maintenance program in operation
anywhere. However, the tendency of organizations and systems
as they grow larger, is to follow their own inertia and
become resistant to change. This resistance can lead to
overlooking new or different possibilities that did not exist
or were not feasible previously.
There are no final conclusions to this report. The
recommendations put forth are simply ideas that have
potential to assist in reducing missile turnaround time.
B. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED
There are several questions that deserve consideration
before changes are made to the maintenance pipeline. They
include :
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1) How much increased capacity should be built into the
maintenance pipeline? Some cushion is required for
wartime needs as well as for further growth in the
inventory. What needs to be determined is how much
additional capacity is desired and in what areas it is
necessary. During wartime, obtaining transportation
and providing temporary storage would probably not be
difficult, but, training production workers and
obtaining additional test e q u i p me n t / t e s t facilities
would be.
2) What is an increase in asset readiness worth? Is the
value gained by reducing turnaround time measured in
monetary terms of the missiles themselves or in the
benefit to national defense.
3) Should the transportation system used by the missile
maintenance pipeline rely on peacetime resources or
expected wartime resources? If it is to be based on
wartime resources, as much required transportation as
possible should be eliminated.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
There are areas that this report was not able to cover in
sufficient depth where further study would be warranted.
These areas are:
1) Systems with similar maintenance programs such as jet
engines or torpedoes. These programs may have faced
similar challenges and found ways of resolving them.
A comparison study could be done to determine how
similar programs deal with change.
2) The depot level maintenance process at contractor and
Navy DOPs. This area should be examined to determine
delays, bottlenecks, and limitations at that mainte-
nance level.
3) The dedicated transportation system for HARPOON.
Determine the results which have occurred after the
initial reduction in turnaround time. Has there been
continued improvement? Is the improvement because of
the transportation or some other factor? Has the
transportation been cost effective? Would dedicated
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